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Book Review: Conflicted Are The Peacemakers: Israeli and
Palestinian Moderates and the Death of Oslo
The 1993 Oslo Accords were a key attempt to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a failure largely attributed
to extremists on both sides. This book challenges this conventional wisdom by examining the role of Israeli and
Palestinian peacemakers themselves in derailing the peace process. Looking at the role of moderates before
and after Oslo, the different agreements and peace proposals they negotiated, and their rhetoric, the book
aims to show that these peacemakers retained an inherent ambivalence toward the peace process and one
another. Reviewed by Jeff Roquen.
Conflicted Are The Peacemakers: Israeli and Palestinian Moderates
and the Death of Oslo. Eric N Budd. Bloomsbury. December 2012.
Find this book:  
It all looked so promising. When Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and
Palestinian leader Yasser Araf at shook hands on the White House lawn in
the presence of  American President Bill Clinton on the same day as their
negotiators signed the Declaration of  Principles (13 September 1993) –
an agreement to end the nearly century-old conf lict – peace truly seemed
to be at hand f or the heart of  the Middle East. In the coming months and
years, however, the brokered deal unraveled to the dismay of  the
international community. Over the past two decades, it has been
conventional wisdom to blame extremists on both sides f or having
successf ully sabotaged the peace process through violence.
In Conflicted Are The Peacemakers: Israeli and Palestinian Moderates and
the Death of Oslo, American prof essor Eric N. Budd challenges the
reigning narrative and largely succeeds in locating the onus of  the
breakdown in an imbalance of  power, the murky text of  the peace accords, and the
ambivalent att itudes of  the moderate peacemakers.
By the early 1990s, new possibilit ies existed to end the Israeli-Palestinian conf lict. The Iran-Iraq
War (1980-88) ended af ter more than seven years of  bloodshed, and a f our-year Palestinian
intif ada (1987-91) against Israel’s occupation of  Palestinian lands prompted both sides to seek a polit ical
solution. Compared to Z ionist and Arab partisans who sought to demonize each other, moderates within
the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), of  whom Budd characterizes as
possessing the f lexibility and credibility needed f or diplomacy, represented a pragmatic, non-violent
alternative. Yet, “moderates” are def ined only in contrast to “extremists,” and as Budd argues, they tend to
bring their own shortcomings and limitations to the negotiating table.
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In Chapter Two “The Road to Oslo,” Budd lays out a tripartite methodology to reveal the inherent f laws
contained within the negotiating strategies of  moderate peacemakers. Although neither wholly concrete nor
universal, these three principles, which represent the core of  Budd’s thesis as applied to Oslo and
subsequent Israeli-Palestinian agreements, shed light on the course of  negotiations and f urther
problematize the ef f icacy of  diplomacy in a complex arena of  historic resentments. Under Principle 1, the
playing f ield of  talks is heavily slanted to one side due to the ability of  the economically and militarily
stronger nation (Israel) to manipulate the agenda of  the peace process. According to Principle 2, an implicit
ambiguity exists in the moderate posit ion. As a result, agreements of  tangible value are seldom produced or
achieved. In the f inal and most crit ical stage of  diplomacy, Budd asserts in Principle 3 that moderates
neither possess the capacity to dispassionately deconstruct their nationalist narratives nor push their
constituents toward f ull reconciliation. In subsequent chapters containing case studies of  Israeli-
Palestinian peace init iatives, Budd validates his approach to a signif icant degree and raises a plethora of
new questions on the dynamics of  war and peace.
From Oslo in 1993 to the Camp David Summit seven years later, Budd makes a convincing case that the
asymmetrical power relationship allowed the Israelis to set the parameters of  the negotiations around their
interests. Not only did the Oslo Declaration of  Principles f ail to address the realization of  a Palestinian
state but the Israelis made f ew territorial concessions. For this central insight, Budd cites the late Columbia
University historian, crit ical theorist and pro-Palestinian advocate Edward Said. Indeed, Said’s contemporary
crit icism of  Oslo seems to have provided the f oundation f or Budd’s f irst principle. Rather than genuine
reciprocity and an equal exchange of  ideas, prime ministers f rom Yitzhak Rabin (1992-95) to Ehud Barak
(1999-2001), along with Israeli negotiating teams, successf ully f orced the talks to pivot on the security of
Israel. From the evidence (including reproductions of  all the major agreements in the appendix), Budd has
raised a legit imate contention, and the prospects f or a settlement may have well been doomed f rom the
beginning as a consequence of  the inequity of  power.
Compared to Principle 1, the case made f or Principle 2 as a signif icant f actor in the collapse of  the Israeli-
Palestinian agreements is somewhat less convincing. According to Budd, the adoption of  “constructive
ambiguity” to move beyond intractable issues produced a f atal vagueness in the negotiated texts. In the
absence of  detailed provisions on the spheres of  legal jurisdiction, the establishment of  a police f orce f or
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the holding of  elections in the Oslo Declaration of  Principles, f or
example, constructive ambiguity allowed and perhaps encouraged each side to interpret the accords to its
advantage. Although undeniably true in some of  the agreements, the negotiators seem to have purposely
avoided specif ic language on the most contentious issues in order to f irst establish a broad, workable
f ramework to prepare a path f or a permanent settlement.
If  the talks had inspired a spirit of  peace and a desire to make history among both the elites and their
constituents – as Budd rightly claims did not occur, then f urther negotiations would have likely been able to
bridge the deepest chasms of  conf lict. By the author ’s own admission, the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement
(1995) f ailed despite being designed f or immediate implementation and concretely addressing hot-button
issues. Hence, the presence of  an asymmetrical distribution of  power (Principle 1), the practice of
diplomatic ambiguity (Principle 2) and/or the stalled deconstruction of  national narratives (Principle 3) does
not account f or each and every f ailed Israeli-Palestinian agreement in the last decade of  the twentieth
century.
As Budd conceives his three principles as tools of  analysis rather than inalterable axioms, his study proves
to be a trenchant re-examination of  the tradit ional narrative. While he will undoubtedly be accused of  either
downplaying the impact of  domestic and regional polit ics or taking a pro-Palestinian slant by some
scholars, his methodology will likely resonate with polit ical scientists, f oreign policy analysts and historians
of  diplomacy. Af ter caref ully considering Budd’s insights, f ew will be able to look at moderates in the same
way again.
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